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Structured Abstract: 
 
In this paper we examine the role of intermediaries in financial markets in fostering corporate sustainability. Responsible Investment (RI) indices 
have been primarily identified as intermediaries that provide information regarding Corporate Social Performance (CSP) for investors and other 
stakeholders (Doh et al. 2010, Consolandi et al. 2009). We argue that the role of these intermediaries is not confined solely to information 
provision, but they may also incentivize high levels of CSP through mechanisms such as exclusion threats, signalling, and engagement. We rely 
on unique access to the archives of the FTSE4Good Index to examine the effects of these mechanisms on CSP. The study shows that companies 
facing exclusion threats and signalling are more likely to comply with the intermediary’s criteria, and medium levels of engagement leads to 
higher levels of CSP. We contribute to the study of sustainability in financial markets by explicating the mechanisms that intermediaries and 
other financial actors could employ in order to foster greater corporate sustainability. 
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Carrot and Stick? The role of financial market intermediaries in Corporate Social Performance  
 Intermediaries play an increasingly important role for equity market participants interested in sustainability and business responsibility. 
Responsible Investment (RI), defined here as the integration of investors’ financial objectives with an evaluation of corporate environmental, 
social and governance concerns, relies on intermediaries to measure the responsible behaviour of companies. One popular group of metrics are 
RI indices, which are essentially weighted listings of stocks that are typically constructed by filtering a broader universe of stocks according to a 
set of Corporate Social Performance (CSP) criteria. RI indices, such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, the Domini Social Index and the 
FTSE4Good Index, are used by investors for the benchmarking of RI funds and the creation of related investment products. They may also serve 
to signal CSP reputation to investors and other stakeholders (Doh et al, 2010), as these indices allow them to make a judgment of the extra-
financial ‘quality’ of corporate stocks. Most of the studies regarding RI indices have focused on the effect of inclusion or exclusion from indices 
on corporate share prices (e.g. see Consolandi et al, 2009; Collison et al, 2008; Capelle-Blancard & Couderc, 2009; Wai, 2011: Robinson, 
Kleffner & Bertels, 2011; Curran & Moran, 2007). However the question remains whether these intermediaries may also have an effect on CSP, 
and if so, what the key mechanisms are to bring about these effects?        We argue that the 
role of intermediaries such as RI indices is not limited solely to information provision, but that they may also contribute to higher levels of CSP 
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in a context where standards for CSP continue to evolve (Bertels & Peloza, 2008). We identify three mechanisms that may move companies 
towards high CSP over time: threatening exclusion from the index when CSP scores do not meet the benchmark, signalling CSP reputation 
through publication of index inclusion, and constructing effective dialogue on CSP through engagement. We show that these mechanisms can be 
effectively used to influence the CSP of large numbers of companies over time. We study the FTSE4Good Index, launched in 2001 by the UK-
based index provider FTSE Group to evaluate the environmental and social performance of companies listed on the major stock exchanges 
around the world. Through unique access to the archives and data related to the FTSE4Good Index, we study the introduction of a new set of 
CSP criteria on anti-bribery and corruption practices. We highlight how exclusion threats, signalling and engagement influence levels of CSP. In 
so doing, we contribute to reputation and legitimacy studies by showing that the role of intermediaries may involve more than pure information 
provision to investors and stakeholders.            We also 
contribute to the theoretical development of studies on shareholder engagement and activism, by explicating the mechanisms that influence CSP. 
Very little is known about the effectiveness of engagement, especially on a larger scale (Gond & Piani, 2013). We provide what we believe is 
one of the first large-N studies of the effect of engagement on corporate behaviour. Based on our dataset we show that engagement can be 
effective in influencing levels of CSP even when applied to large numbers of companies. Our results show how engagement interacts with 
corporate reputation and legitimacy in fostering compliance with intermediaries CSP criteria and may lead to higher levels of CSP. 
 The paper is structured as follows: first we review the role of intermediaries in conferring corporate reputation and legitimacy that has 
been previously identified in the literature. Next, we build our hypotheses related to the three mechanisms for influencing CSP, and describe our 
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methods for testing these in the case of the FTSE4Good Index. We continue to present the results and conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of our findings for the study of intermediaries, CSP and engagement. 
Intermediaries as information providers    
Intermediaries play an important role in markets that are characterised by information asymmetries.  Studies on a wide range of 
intermediaries such as certification bodies (Rao, 1994, 1998), media rankings (Rindova et al 2005), and financial analysts (Zuckerman, 2000; 
Benner & Ranganathan, 2012), show that where there is a lack of concrete information about aspects of firm performance, or performance is 
difficult for the general public to observe, evaluation by intermediaries provides legitimacy and reputation signals that might in turn influence 
financial performance. Fombrum & Shanley (1990) find evidence that CSP forms a subset of the signals that corporate reputation is based on, 
but due to information asymetries stakeholders are reliant on intermediaries to evaluate CSP. In a similar vein, Doh et al (2010) argue that 
aspects of CSP are difficult to observe by an organisation’s stakeholders, and that RI indices act as ‘institutional intermediaries’ which ‘by 
including (or excluding) firms from their indices…send clear and strong signals to investors about whether firms have met the credible 
Corporate Social Responsibility criteria established by these organisations’ (Doh et al 2010: 1466).       
    Research into the main RI indices in the RI market, has focused mainly on the financial performance of these 
indices (Collison et al., 2008) or the effect of inclusion and exclusion from the indices on share price (Capelle & Couderc, 2009; Wai, 2011; 
Robinson et al, 2011; Doh et al, 2010).These studies have not examined whether inclusion in RI indices can have effects on CSP. There is 
increasing evidence that the measurement by intermediaries is not neutral, but may act to incentivise improvements in what is being measured, 
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especially when reputational stakes are high (Sauder, 2006; 2008; Sauder & Espeland, 2009). Studies in the context of higher education show 
that obtaining a good evaluation by intermediaries in rankings and ratings becomes an important part of maintaining organisational reputation, 
and that many organisations will adjust their behaviour to obtain a favourable evaluation (Sauder 2006; 2008; Sauder & Espeland, 2009). We 
argue that the signal for reputation and legitimacy provided by RI indices may similarly influence levels of CSP. Researching these effects will 
provide better understanding of the role of intermediaries in fostering sustainability, and responds to the call for research that examines CSP as 
the dependent variable (Waddock & Graves, 1997).      A potential explanation for the lack of understanding 
about intermediaries’ role in influencing CSP may derive from the fact that most studies focus on the informational role of intermediaries only. 
In essence, these studies take the outcome of the evaluation process undertaken by the intermediary as given, and study the effect of the outcome 
on share price. In doing so, important processes and mechanisms that might spur higher levels of CSP are missed. For example, our study shows 
that intermediaries engage with corporations to gather CSP information and provide advice about the evaluation criteria. This engagement tries 
to convince companies to aim for higher levels of CSP, just like shareholder engagement (Clark & Hebb, 2004; Southwood, 2003) or 
shareholder dialogue (Logsdon & van Buren, 2009) aims to do. Because shareholder engagement often takes place in private conversations 
between corporate management and the engaging party, it is difficult to measure its effects on a large scale. Based on the unique dataset we 
gathered for our study of the FTSE4Good Index, which includes correspondence between the two parties in engagement, we can show that 
engagement is an important mechanism that can be used by intermediaries to influence levels of CSP.  In the next section we build our 
theoretical framework explicating the mechanisms that may influence CSP through intermediaries in RI markets. 
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Three mechanisms for influencing CSP 
Drawing from and extending previous literatures, we identify three mechanisms underlying RI indices that may influence levels of CSP: the 
threat of index exclusion (labelled exclusion threat), the signalling of CSP reputation through the publication of index inclusion (labelled 
signalling), and the establishment of an engagement dialogue regarding required CSP levels (labelled engagement). We discuss each in turn, but 
first distinguish between two key concepts in our framework: legitimacy and reputation.      In the literature 
on corporate reputation, the economic perspective emphasises individual firm attributes such as efficiency or financial performance, whilst the 
institutional perspective focuses on a firm’s relative status amongst its peers (Doh et al, 2010; Rindova et al, 2005; Love & Kraatz, 2009). 
Legitimacy, a concept of central concern in institutional theory, can be seen as a precursor to reputation (Doh et al, 2010; Rindova et al, 2005: 
Deephouse & Carter, 2005). From this perspective legitimacy is derived from the adherence to commonly accepted standards and norms of 
corporate behaviour in an organisational field (Suchman, 1995; Scott, 2001; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). Corporate reputation may be derived 
from adherence to the same norms and standards that define legitimacy, but additionally is derived from relative performance against the firm’s 
peers in that field (King & Whetten, 2008; Deephouse & Carter, 2005). Thus, the evaluation of adherence to commonly accepted norms and 
standards plays a central role in both conferring legitimacy and signalling reputation (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).    
  The conferring of legitimacy through index inclusion is the most widely acknowledged role of RI indices. For example, 
Consolandi et al (2009) argue that inclusion in RI indices confers legitimacy as it shows compliance with global CSP standards to investors and 
stakeholders of the company. RI indices can be used by investors for identifying target companies for engagement, especially with those 
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companies that are not included (Oulton, 2006). Additionally, the indices have also become a tool for a wider group of actors within the CSP 
industry. NGOs use them as a tool to identify ‘good’ companies to partner with or ‘bad’ companies to campaign against, while consultants may 
identify excluded companies as profitable potential clients (Slager, Gond & Moon, 2012).     The conferring of 
legitimacy is a powerful incentive to improve CSP for those companies who do not meet the mark set by the intermediary (Consolandi et al, 
2009). Chatterji and Toffel (2010) find that firms will improve their performance in response to poor ratings from RI intermediaries, in order to 
mitigate the threat of stakeholder sanctions. Yet research suggests the threat of taking away this legitimacy, once conferred, may provide even 
stronger incentives for change. Doh et al (2010) find that the effect on share price is limited to those firms that are deleted from the Calvert 
Social Index, and attribute this to asymmetric information on poor CSP performance. They argue that because of this asymmetry, deletion will 
come as more of a surprise to investors than inclusion (Doh et al 2010:1479).   In line with this, Scalet and Kelly (2009) find that most firms 
don’t communicate about negative events that lead to an exclusion from ratings. The idea that bad news attracts more attention than good news 
may also underlie the fear of being excluded from RI indices reported by managers in a survey of the FTSE4Good Index (Collison et al., 2009).
    Most RI indices change their criteria for good CSP over time, to take into account current developments and 
changing global standards relating to environmental, social and governance performance (Bertels & Peloza, 2008). For example both the 
FTSE4Good Index and the DJSI have added assessment criteria for issues such as climate change and supply chain standards in the last decade 
(FTSE, 2011, RobecoSAM, 2013). This means companies that may have previously met the intermediaries’ criteria for good CSP need to 
improve their CSP in order to ensure their continued conformance. This process of raising the bar for index inclusion entails a threat to those 
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companies who in the past met the CSP criteria, but now face exclusion. Following the logic that exclusion has stronger effects than inclusion, 
we propose that companies which face this threat are more likely to work towards compliance with the intermediaries’ CSP criteria in order to 
avoid the threat of exclusion:  
Hypothesis 1: Those companies who are threatened by exclusion from RI indices are more likely to comply with the intermediary’s general 
CSP criteria for index inclusion in subsequent years. 
The inclusion of a firm in a RI index may act as the endorsement (Rhee & Valdez, 2009) of that firm’s CSP because the evaluation by RI 
intermediaries is perceived to be objective and in accordance with global standards (Doh et al, 2010). RI indices provide ‘a normative 
benchmark for firms seeking to achieve a positive reputation for corporate social responsibility and […] a guidepost for audiences concerned 
about the socially responsible practices of companies they invest in’ (Doh et al, 2010: 1470). Although often ignored in studies on 
intermediaries, it is important to acknowledge the active role of firms themselves in signalling reputation through using intermediaries’ 
endorsements (Deephouse and Suchman 2008). Although inclusion in the indices itself could be seen as signal of meeting norms, firms often 
enhance this signalling effect, by communicating inclusion in indices in corporate materials. For example, many firms use the logos of RI indices 
in their CSP disclosure as a certification of good CSP (Consolandi et al, 2009), and the legitimacy of these signals are thus co-constructed 
between firms and intermediaries (Durand & McGuire, 2005). These firms use the assessment by RI intermediaries and resultant inclusion in RI 
indices as a ‘stamp of approval’ for CSP performance, and, in the absence of other global standardised assessment measures of CSP, this is often 
valorised as such by other parties, such as NGO’s, the media, and consultants (Slager et al, 2012).       
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 Research on the use of third party assessments in the field of higher education shows that their ubiquitous nature in organisational 
communications increases their reputation effects (Sauder 2006; 2008). Nevertheless, not all companies will recognise and use index inclusion to 
signal good CSP performance. Given that companies may choose to use intermediary endorsements for reputation signalling purposes, we expect 
that companies that use RI indices to signal CSP reputation will ensure their continued conformance with the standards set by RI indices, as their 
failure to do so will lead to reputational damage. In addition, we expect that these companies have higher levels of CSP in subsequent years: 
Hypothesis 2a: Those companies that signal CSP reputation to their stakeholders through intermediary endorsements are more likely to 
comply with the intermediary’s general CSP criteria for index inclusion in subsequent years. 
Hypothesis 2b: Those companies that signal CSP reputation to their stakeholders through intermediary endorsements are more likely to have 
higher levels of CSP in subsequent years. 
Shareholder engagement is becoming increasingly popular as a RI strategy in Europe (Clark & Hebb, 2004; Southwood, 2003) and the US, 
where it has been termed ‘Dialogue’ to distinguish it from more aggressive shareholder activism (Logsdon & van Buren, 2009). Due to the 
private nature of shareholder engagement, which often takes place behind the closed doors of the company boardroom, little is known about the 
organisational context and process of engagement (Gond & Piani, 2013). From existing qualitative, small N studies we can distil four factors that 
are common in shareholder engagement processes, and which, as we’ll show below, also feature in engagement undertaken by intermediaries 
such as FTSE in relation to their FTSE4Good Index. First, in their dialogue with corporate management shareholders often frame their concerns 
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regarding poor CSP in terms of reputational risk and potential impact on long term financial performance (Gond & Piani, 2013). Second, there is 
an emphasis on building trust in the dialogue with corporate management, with antagonistic tactics generally being eschewed (Vandekerckhove, 
Leys & Van Braeckel, 2007; McLaren, 2004). Third, the goals of the dialogue may simply be information exchange on the issue of concern or 
include more extensive influencing of corporate policies or reporting that are drawn up in response (Gond & Piani, 2013; Gifford, 2010). Lastly, 
dialogues are often drawn out over extensive periods of time, and the threat of more aggressive tactics such as filing shareholder resolutions or 
selling of shares is often only used implicitly (Gifford, 2010; Logsdon & van Buren, 2009). Sullivan and MacKenzie (2008) argue that objectives 
of this private dialogue with shareholders may be to raise the profile of CSP with corporate management, legitimise debate about contentious 
issues and encourage management to meet certain CSP standards. Logsdon and van Buren (2009) highlight that, compared to shareholder 
activism, effective engagement requires different skills and tactics, including patience, effective dialogue and trust (Logsdon and van Buren 
2009).     
Whilst shareholders may have more salience than other stakeholder groups, engagement tactics are not the sole domain of shareholders. 
Similar tactics may be employed by RI intermediaries. Slager et al (2012) show that engagement efforts are central to the construction of the 
FTSE4Good Index, both in terms of convening stakeholders to set CSP criteria, and through direct dialogue with companies when CSP criteria 
are ratcheted up.  Index engagement shares some of the main characteristics of shareholder engagement described above: it consists of a long 
term dialogue, framed around information exchange on CSP performance and influencing corporate policies or reporting on CSP issues. 
Similarly, index engagement requires skills, time and resources that can be accumulated over time (Slager et al, 2012). It focuses on those 
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companies under threat of exclusion from the Index, who are invited to engage in dialogue about their CSP and the Index criteria. This aims to 
raise levels of CSP over time, and enables them to remain included in the FTSE4Good Index as new criteria on specific issues such as 
countering bribery are introduced. Engagement is voluntary, and companies may choose not to respond to the intermediary. We argue that 
companies who do respond and participate in engagement are more likely to comply with the new criteria and to have higher performance in the 
respective area of CSP following the guidance given by the intermediary during the engagement process. Just like with shareholder engagement, 
effective index engagement requires time and active participation from companies. The more both parties actively engage in dialogue, the more 
likely it is this will affect levels of CSP. Thus, engagement presents a third mechanism that may be employed to influence levels of CSP on 
specific issues of engagement: 
Hypothesis 3: Those companies that take part in higher levels of engagement with the intermediary are more likely to have higher levels of 
CSP in subsequent years. 
Methods 
For our study we collected a unique dataset relating to the FTSE4Good Index, consisting of private correspondence, CSP data and corporate 
data. Companies that meet the FTSE4Good Index CSP criteria are automatically included in the FTSE4Good Index (i.e. they do not self-select to 
be included). During the period analysed information on CSP was gathered and scored independently by social research agency EIRIS, which 
collects and evaluates information from company reports, webpages and information directly provided by companies. Twice a year the 
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FTSE4Good Policy Committee convenes to review the Index CSP criteria and include or exclude companies. The FTSE4Good Index has the 
dual objective to serve investors interested in RI, and to incentivise companies to improve their CSP through raising the bar for Index inclusion 
(FTSE, 2010; Slager et al, 2012; Mackenzie, Rees, & Rodionova, 2013). Additional inclusion criteria have been introduced throughout the years 
since the Index was launched, on topics as diverse as climate change, supply chain labour standards and anti-bribery practices. 
In this paper we study the effects of the exclusion threats, signalling, and engagement specifically related to the FTSE4Good Countering 
Bribery (CB) criteria, first announced in July 2006. This new category of CSP criteria require ‘high risk’ companies operating in corrupt 
environments to have in place policies and management systems to counter bribery and corruption in their operations, and to publicly report on 
their policies and management systems. The risk categorisation is based on industry sectors, countries of operation and involvement in 
government contracts. Appendix A lists the high risk categorisation and criteria indicators in full.  
The FTSE4Good Index is managed on a day-to-day basis by the FTSE RI team. During the introduction of the new Countering Bribery 
criteria, the FTSE RI team firstly provided information regarding the criteria to companies; secondly it provided warnings to those companies 
which were in the Index but were not meeting the new criteria; and subsequently it tried to engage in dialogue with these companies. In the 
engagement process companies had the chance to provide evidence to show they are working towards meeting the criteria, a process which may 
take several months to years. The FTSE4Good Policy Committee ultimately decides whether a company should be excluded from the Index after 
this period of engagement, based on an evaluation of information provided by EIRIS and the FTSE RI team.    
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For this study’s sample, we selected all listed European companies that were categorised by EIRIS as operating in an environment with high 
risk for encountering bribery. Fifty-seven percent of companies in the sample were included in the FTSE4Good Index in the observation period, 
hence roughly forty percent were not included in the Index.1 The resulting panel is unbalanced due to mergers, acquisitions etc., and is presented 
as a pooled panel. The total sample includes 254 companies and 813 observations. The observation period began in 2007 and ended in 2010.  
This period was chosen because we expected the full effects of the mechanisms identified (exclusion threat, signalling, and engagement) to be 
observable within this period. Table 1 describes the variables used in the study and their data sources. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Dependent variable 
Data regarding the new FTSE4Good Countering Bribery criteria started to be collected by EIRIS from 2006 onwards following a consultation 
led by FTSE to define methodology  Data exists for most companies categorised as high risk from 2007. The data for 2007 is therefore taken as a 
baseline in the study. The data covers the EIRIS evaluation of the quality of anti-bribery policies, management systems and corporate reporting. 
These three elements are rated by text grades: no evidence, limited, intermediate, good and advanced. In line with previous use of the EIRIS 
database by Brammer and Millington (2008), the text gradings are converted into numerical scores. Because the number of companies rated 
                                                 
1 The companies that are not in the Index do not meet either the technical criteria (free float, market cap); the other FTSE4Good inclusion criteria; or the exclusion criteria 
(e.g. companies involved in production of weapon systems). All companies in the sample are classified by EIRIS as operating in environment with high risk for corruption 
and bribery. 
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good is low (N<10), the categories of good and advanced are merged into one, leading to numerical scores between 0-3 on the each of the three 
elements. As the  ‘intermediate’ grade was designed to reflect the FTSE4Good index inclusion threshold, this still provides enough information 
for the analysis.   
The analysis employs two dependent variables: compliance with the overall FTSE4Good Index inclusion criteria and the quality of 
Countering Bribery practices in particular. The first dependent variable, compliance, is a binary variable that identifies companies that have the 
received the minimum score that is needed to remain in the FTSE4Good Index. Thus a 1 signifies the company complies with the Index criteria, 
and has the level of CSP that is required to remain in the index. Data on compliance for the observation period is taken from the FTSE4Good 
database.  The compliance dependent variable is used to test hypothesis 1 and 2a. Whilst the first dependent variable provides a binary indication 
of broad compliance with the Index criteria, we create a second dependent variable to test a fuller range of performance on a specific CSP issue.  
The second dependent variable, Countering Bribery practices, is the summed total score for the three Countering Bribery criteria elements, as 
given by EIRIS.  A company with elaborate and high quality Countering Bribery practices receives a higher score than those companies which 
disclose little about their countering bribery practices or lack appropriate policies and management systems. Thus higher levels of the dependent 
variable reflect higher levels of CSP in this area. We include this second dependent variable in our analysis in particular to test the effects of 
engagement on the new Countering Bribery criteria that took place during the observation period (see below); it is thus used to test hypothesis 2b 
and 3. Whilst subsuming CSP aspects into one aggregate score has been criticised as theoretically and empirically unsound (Griffin & Mahon, 
1997), here the aggregated score is less problematic because it measures only one aspect of CSP. 
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Independent variables 
The independent variables are created based on FTSE4Good archival data and corporate data. The FTSE4Good archival data collected includes a 
longitudinal database that is used to identify all companies eligible for Index inclusion based on their CSP scores. It also includes private 
correspondence between companies and the FTSE RI team, such as formal letters, emails and minutes of meetings. The correspondence is 
normally started by the FTSE RI team when a company is warned regarding not meeting the Countering Bribery criteria. The subsequent 
dialogue would include for example discussions about definitions of whistle blowing or facilitation payments; companies providing more 
information about anti-bribery managing systems; or questioning appropriate forms of corporate reporting. The dialogue is continued until the 
company meets the criteria or is deleted from the Index. The data collected from FTSE4Good and corporate sources was used to create three 
independent variables as proxies for the three mechanisms identified.  
First, we create a binary measure of exclusion threat. Data regarding the compliance of European companies with the Countering Bribery 
criteria were extracted from the FTSE4Good archives.  A company is coded 1, if it does not meet the Countering Bribery criteria, but continues 
to be included in the Index in that year. It is coded 0 otherwise. This binary measure corresponds to those companies facing the threat of 
exclusion from the Index due to not meeting the Countering Bribery criteria at that point in time. It serves as a precursor to the process of 
engagement (see below) which may serve to incentivize compliance with the Index criteria in subsequent years. To allow for this time effect 
exclusion threat is lagged by one year in the analysis. 
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Second, we create the measure of signalling by examining CSP disclosure. If a company in the FTSE4Good Index advertises the fact that it 
is included in the Index, this can signal reputation for ‘good CSP’, and act as a reputation differentiator (Suchman & Deephouse, 2008). FTSE 
does not advertise the complete list of Index constituents. Instead, companies may opt to undertake this signalling through promoting Index 
inclusion as a de facto certification of their CSP (Slager et al, 2012; Consolandi et al, 2009). To assess whether a company was using 
FTSE4Good as a signalling tool, stand-alone CSP reports and, where no stand-alone CSP report was published, sections of annual reports 
reporting on CSP were examined for the period between 2007 and 2010. Signalling was coded 1 if the company included the name or logo of the 
FTSE4Good Index in its reporting that year, and 0 otherwise. Although the logo is widely used in annual CSP communication, not all companies 
use the logo. Just over half (58%) of the companies included in the Index used signalling in the observation period. Signalling is lagged by one 
year in the analysis to capture its effect on compliance and levels of CSP in subsequent years.  
Third, we create the measure engagement based on the FTSE archive of correspondence with companies regarding the Countering Bribery 
criteria. As highlighted above, companies are not automatically excluded from the Index when they do not meet the criteria. Instead, they have 
the opportunity to enter into engagement with the FTSE RI team on the specific criteria they are not meeting. Only if a company is not 
responsive to the opportunity for discussion, or it is clear that it cannot or does not want to meet the criteria, will it be excluded at the initial 
deadline.  Where a company is making progress and makes a formal written commitment to FTSE the FTSE4Good Policy Committee will 
normally approve an extension of the company’s deadline. As the exclusion threat acts as a precursor to engagement, the variables are not 
independent and we analyse their effects in separate models.  We include the measure of engagement to test the effects on a specific topic of 
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CSP, in this case countering bribery. We collected the archived correspondence between the FTSE RI team and companies engaged on the 
Countering Bribery criteria (500+ emails), and summarised and coded their contents. To create an ordinal measure of engagement we coded for 
the length and intensity of the correspondence. The number of months the company is in engagement plus the number of company actions (e.g. 
sending more information, requesting a meeting etc.) are summed into a total score for engagement intensity. Engagement intensity is coded 
‘low’ for the 1st quartile; ‘medium’ for the 2nd quartile, and ‘high’ for the 3rd and 4th quartile of the scores generated by coding the 
correspondence. A ‘low’ engagement score means the engagement lasted less than six months, which is the time between two Index reviews, and 
the company undertook relatively little action. More intensive engagement can be characterised by a flurry of company actions, engagement over 
a prolonged period of time, or both. Those classified in the high engagement category would have higher levels of company activity over a 
prolonged period of time. This ordinal measure of engagement corresponds to the idea that companies in intensive engagement are likely to 
benefit more from the dialogue between the FTSE RI team and corporate management. Again, engagement is lagged by one year to enable us to 
capture its effects on countering bribery practices in subsequent years. 
Control variables 
As Doh et al (2010) point out; the degree of information asymmetry regarding CSP can be reduced by intermediaries or by the firm itself. 
Transparency and good quality CSP reporting reduces information asymmetry and facilitates evaluation by intermediaries, as well as other 
stakeholders. Companies are more likely to provide information on relevant aspects of CSP if they have a history of being open about CSP 
practices and have set up corporate structures to report CSP and deal with information requests. We control for the quality of existing CSP 
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reporting by extracting data from the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Sustainability Disclosure database. The GRI Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines have become the de-facto standard for meaningful, high quality CSP reporting (Etzion & Ferraro, 2010). First introduced in 1999, the 
current version of the Guidelines includes recommendations for disclosure on bribery and corruption. A company is coded 1 if it has reported to 
use the GRI and 0 otherwise, for each of the years in the observation period. If the company is using GRI, it is assumed that information 
asymmetry is lower, and that existing reporting systems may enable a faster response to new requests for CSP data from intermediaries. 
We also control for firm characteristics that have been identified as introducing variance in CSP, such as organisational size, financial 
performance, risk, and industry sector (Orlitzky et al, 2003; Margolis, Elfenbein & Walsh, 2007; Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2001). Financial data 
were taken from Datastream. Organisational size was controlled for by taking the natural logarithm of the number of employees. An accounting-
based measure of financial performance, return on assets, was used to control for financial performance, to reflect the company’s use of 
resources and financial strength. The long-term debt to total assets ratio was taken as a proxy for financial risk (Waddock & Graves, 1997). The 
industry sectors represented in the sample were restricted to those considered high risk for encountering bribery and corruption as per the FTSE 
classification (see appendix A). We expect that companies from high risk industry sectors will undertake more action to comply with CSP 
standards in this area, whilst we want to control for intra-industry differences.  The number of industry sectors represented in the sample was 
coded following the Industry Classification Benchmark. The selected reference group, the technology sector, has above average scores in the 
Transparency International Bribe Payers index (meaning less reported instances of bribery) (Transparency International, 2011). Thus the 
industry sectors in the analysis were deemed higher risk for corruption and bribery relative to the reference group, technology. According to 
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McWilliams and Siegel (2000; 2001, 2011), CSP can be viewed as a form of product innovation (i.e., the creation of new socially responsible 
product features or categories) or process innovation (i.e., the use of a socially responsible production process) (McWilliams & Siegel 
2011:1491). We thus control for R&D expenditure by collecting data on intangible assets, including goodwill, patents, and copyright from 
Datastream. The natural logarithm of intangibles is used in the dataset. Lastly, the degree of government regulation may also influence how 
firms respond to activists’ pressures (Chatterji & Toffel, 2010; Reid & Toffel, 2009). A dummy variable was created to control for companies 
based in the UK. Within Europe, the UK can be considered to have the most advanced regulation regarding corruption and bribery in the form of 
the UK Bribery Act (Osuji, 2011). Whilst the introduction of the UK Bribery Act was delayed and it only came into force in 2011, consultations 
regarding the act first started in 2002 and 2005. Therefore, companies in the UK might have anticipated the forthcoming regulation. 
Analysis 
Two models were estimated to test the hypotheses. The logit analysis in model 1 tests the effects of the exclusion threat and signalling on the 
general compliance with the FTSE4Good Index inclusion criteria; thus testing Hypotheses 1 and 2a.  The Tobit analysis in model 2 tests the 
effects of signalling and engagement on the quality of Countering Bribery practices; testing Hypotheses 2b and 3.The dependent variable in 
model 2 is censored in the sense that it can only have values between 0 and 9, and cannot take negative values. This means a censored regression 
technique is necessitated since ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation can provide both biased and inconsistent parameter estimates (Greene 
2008, Greene & Hensher, 2010). The most commonly adopted solution to these types of data is to estimate a Tobit model using by maximum-
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likelihood estimation (e.g. see Brammer & Millington, 2006; 2008). The Tobit model is suitable when the dependent variable is zero for a 
nontrivial proportion of the sample, and roughly continuously distributed over the positive values (Greene, 2008).  
Both models are pooled to allow for the examination of variance over time. A pooled model effectively ignores individual effects to explore 
situations in which the main interest is in the effect of an intervention (in this case the introduction of the Countering Bribery criteria in the 
Index), the cases do not constitute a random sample of the population and the panel is unbalanced (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Hsiao, 1985: 1182-1183; 
Petersen, 1993). Time effects can be captured in pooled analysis by including year dummies. We have included dummy variables for the years in 
our observation period. All independent and control variables were lagged by one year in order to avoid reverse causality. This also makes sense 
substantially we expect the effects of engagement on CSP to develop over time. All variables were estimated with robust standard errors. 
Results 
The models were estimated using Stata 13. The descriptive statistics are provided in table 2. Table 3 provides the results of Model 1. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert table 2 and 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
Model 1 illustrates the effects of exclusion threats and signalling on compliance with the FTSE4Good Index inclusion criteria. The 
coefficients in logit models are not straightforwardly interpreted as they are reported as the log of odds. To enable more intuitive interpretation, 
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we present the results of the logit model in table 3 in odds ratios, which are interpreted in this model as the odds of compliance with FTSE4Good 
criteria/ odds of non-compliance with FTSE4Good Criteria. This allows a more intuitive interpretation of the results of the logit model. The 
results confirm Hypothesis 1, which predicted companies who are threatened by exclusion from RI indices are more likely to comply with the 
intermediary’s general CSP criteria for index inclusion in subsequent years. Exclusion threat is positive and significant: the odds ratio shows that 
those companies that have encountered an exclusion threat in the previous year meeting FTSE4Good criteria is 2.875:1; i.e. companies that face 
exclusion threats are nearly 3 times more likely to meet the FTSE4Good criteria in subsequent years than those that don’t. The results also 
confirm Hypothesis 2a, which predicted that companies that signal CSP reputation through intermediary endorsements are more likely to comply 
with the intermediary’s CSP criteria in subsequent years. The results of the logit model shows the strength of the signalling effect, as the odds 
ratio for signalling can be interpreted as companies which signal inclusion in the FTSE4Good index in CSP disclosure are nearly 6 times more 
likely to meet the criteria the following year. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert table 4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
        
Table 4 reports the results of Model 2, the Tobit model that examines the effects of signalling and engagement regarding countering bribery 
issues on the quality of the Countering Bribery practices, as measured by the EIRIS scores.  The results confirm the positive and significant 
effects of signalling, supporting Hypotheses 2b. Hypothesis 3, which predicted that those companies that take part in higher levels of 
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engagement with the intermediary are more likely to have higher levels of CSP in subsequent years, is partially supported. We find that whilst 
the medium level of engagement is significant and positive, low and high levels of engagement are not significant.  For the control variables, we 
find that the coefficients for CSP reporting, size, intangible assets, the oil & gas, healthcare and utilities industries (in model 2 only), and the 
year dummies are all positive and significant (p<0.01). 
Discussion 
Previous research has taken a rather one dimensional view of intermediaries as information providers, which evaluate corporate practices against 
set standards, with improved information provision as the main outcome of this process. Within these studies, the improved information 
provision translates into signals regarding corporate reputation and legitimacy that may affect financial performance (King & Whetten, 2008; 
Rindova et al, 2005; Doh et al, 2010). However these studies have not examined a number of additional roles that intermediaries may undertake. 
Our findings suggest RI intermediaries do more than providing legitimacy to companies when providing a benchmark for the evaluation of 
‘good’ CSP. They may play an active role in fostering corporate sustainability. First, inclusion in RI indices such as the FTSE4Good Index 
creates a level playing field of legitimate companies with good CSP.  By raising the bar for ‘good CSP’ through the introduction of new Index 
criteria, the FTSE4Good Index has incentivised companies to improve CSP. When FTSE introduces new Index inclusion criteria, this is taken as 
a signal that the relevant issue has become part of the CSP agenda and needs to be addressed accordingly. The results support the view that the 
FTSE RI team is able to successfully convince companies to comply with new Index inclusion criteria, by using the promise of continued index 
inclusion as a carrot and the threat of index deletion as a stick. 
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Second, companies may also wish to leverage their perceived legitimacy in this field to signal CSP reputation, by differentiating their CSP 
disclosure from non-included companies by displaying the logos of RI indices. Whether focussing on overall compliance or performance on a 
specific issue such as countering bribery, we found that the effects of signalling are strong. The finding supports the idea that the FTSE4Good 
Index is used by companies as a certification of good CSP practices to strengthen reputation (Doh et al, 2010; Consolandi et al, 2009).  
Third, RI intermediaries may undertake index engagement, which shows similar characteristics to shareholder engagement: a process of 
dialogue with company management regarding CSP performance that often requires significant investment in time and resources from both 
parties (Gond & Piani, 2013; Gifford, 2010; Logsdon & van Buren, 2009). Index engagement presses companies for more transparency on CSP, 
and also serves to provide companies information and guidance on index criteria. It may be used as new Index criteria such as the Countering 
Bribery criteria are introduced to large numbers of companies. Our findings show index engagement may be effective at encouraging companies 
to improve CSP. However, results were not consistent across all categories of engagement. The results show that whilst medium engagement 
produces higher CSP scores in subsequent years, lower and higher levels of engagement do not. This suggests that those companies that are 
either in short or protracted dialogues are less likely to ultimately improve their practices on specific CSP issues. It seems there is an optimum 
period of effective engagement (between 7 to 15 months in this case), after which the dialogue is less likely to lead improved CSP practices 
regarding bribery and corruption. This medium intensity engagement is most likely to produce results for intermediaries. 
The findings further imply that using standardized templates for transparency and reporting on CSP facilitates evaluation by external rating 
agencies, and reduces information asymmetries with other stakeholders. Using the GRI reporting standards signals that reporting systems are in 
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place to accommodate information requests from intermediaries. However, care should be taken in interpreting this finding, as the GRI provides 
only guidelines for reporting, not rigid standards. Companies which use the GRI may still display variance in their CSP disclosure to the public, 
including on issues related to countering bribery. With regards to the control variables, larger firms and those with greater intangible assets are 
more likely to have better Countering Bribery practices. The results show perhaps unsurprisingly that companies in industry sectors known for 
corruption scandals (e.g. Shell in Nigeria, or the unfolding case of GlaxoSmithKline in China) are more likely to have better anti-corruption 
systems. It was also found that companies in the UK, where there is stricter anti-corruption legislation in place, are more likely to have higher 
performance on countering bribery practices. This concurs with the findings by Chatterji and Toffel (2010) and Reid and Toffel (2009) who find 
that higher levels of government regulation leads to higher levels CSP. We also find time effects, showing that as more time has passed since the 
introduction of the Countering Bribery criteria in 2007, companies are more likely to be compliant and show higher levels of CSP on this issue.
  
Implications and future research  
Our study has multiple implications for the study of corporate reputation and the role of intermediaries in signalling reputation in situations of 
information asymmetry, such as those related to CSP. First, standards for CSP do not appear out of nowhere, and intermediaries may play an 
active role in setting or promoting the norms, standards and behavioural guidelines that determine the legitimacy of corporate behaviour in a 
given field (Suchman 1995, Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000). As can be seen in the case of FTSE4Good, intermediaries may use the Index as both 
a carrot and stick to change corporate behaviour by continuously raising the bar for what is considered to be good CSP. In doing so, 
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intermediaries must negotiate substantial cultural, legal and institutional differences in norms and standards for CSP around the world. 
Intermediaries’ role in setting and diffusing globally accepted standards merits more critical attention in research on CSP and reputation.  
Second, the research on corporate reputation rarely takes into account the feedback role of reputation intermediaries. Yet a growing stream 
of research on third party evaluation of organisational performance through rankings, ratings, certification and accreditation shows that the 
process of social evaluation incentivises changes in organisational behaviour, especially when reputational stakes are high (Sauder & Espeland 
2009; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). This feedback effect indicates the existence of multidirectional relationships between corporate practices, 
evaluation and reputation, that deserve further scrutiny.  
Third, intermediaries may choose to play an active role through engagement with their subjects of evaluation. Engagement by intermediaries 
may range from the soliciting of information needed to evaluate performance to the active lobbying of management to comply with the criteria 
of evaluation. In the case of the FTSE4Good Index engagement was necessitated by the need to minimise turnover of Index constituents and the 
explicit objective for the Index to incentivise change in CSP (Slager et al, 2012). Whilst the FTSE4Good Index has been public about its 
engagement strategy, there may be examples of intermediaries where engagement is more obscured from public view. For example, certification 
or accreditation may only prove a valuable legitimating signal once a critical mass of participating organisations has been reached, and 
certification bodies may need to engage with their target organisation to convince them of the worth of certification (Durand & McGuire, 2005). 
This engagement may be hidden from view, but, as our findings show, its effects on corporate practices need to be taken into account when 
studying the role of intermediaries. 
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Finally, there is increasing recognition of the active role firms play in managing the reputational signals emitted by intermediaries. Elsbach 
and Kramer (1996) show that when rankings produced by intermediaries are perceived to be a threat to organisational identity , organisational 
members may choose to highlight other types of evaluation which align more closely with their values (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996). With the 
multitude of rankings and lists that exist nowadays to measure CSP, it is easy for firms to promote only those that show them in good light. New 
research in institutional theory recognises organisational actors play an active role in establishing, maintaining or disrupting institutions 
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009), and this may include a more active response to market intermediaries that 
uphold institutions. For example, whereas securities analysts have traditionally been seen as a source of institutional pressure in financial 
markets (Zuckerman, 1999; Beunza & Garud, 2007), current research have emphasised the active response of companies in offsetting or 
manipulating analysts’ recommendations (Benner & Ranganathan,  2012). Further research could examine whether and how CSP signals from 
intermediaries are managed by companies. 
Our study also has implications for the study of engagement processes. Previous research on shareholder engagement has emphasised the 
unique and individual nature of interaction between shareholders and company management, indicating that each dialogue requires sufficient 
attention to be paid to specific company contexts as well as the CSP issue of concern. This finding may to some degree be an artefact of the 
research methods in these studies, which often employ a limited number of qualitative case studies with little comparative analysis (Gond & 
Piani, 2013; Southwood, 2003; Gifford, 2010). Of course, due to the private nature of shareholder engagement dialogues, large datasets are hard 
to come by for researchers. Based on to the FTSE4Good dataset collated for this study, we show that index engagement can effectively involve 
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large numbers of companies. Classifying companies into risk categories based on their exposure to CSP elements such as bribery and corruption 
means that a degree of inter-firm differences can still be taken into account, even when engaging large numbers of firms.  The findings imply 
that index engagement may use the threat of exclusion as a stick and reputation signalling as a carrot to incentivise companies to comply with set 
CSP standards. Lastly, the findings indicate that there might be an optimal timeframe for engagement, and that protracted engagement might be 
less effective in achieving high levels of CSP, indicating other mechanisms such as exclusion should be considered at that point. 
Our study has a number of limitations. The relatively short time span of the observation period (2007-2010) tells us little about longer term 
effects. Future work could analyse responses to index inclusion and engagement over longer periods of time. Furthermore, countering bribery 
practices form only one part of the spectrum of activities, processes and structures that make up CSP. Further work needs to be done before the 
findings might be generalised to other areas of CSP. For example, what is the role of regulation and voluntary initiatives in areas such as the 
protection of human rights or labour standards in the supply chain? The current analysis also isolates the companies identified as being at high 
risk for encountering bribery and corruption. Further research could identify whether the companies which face lower risk are more or less likely 
to respond to index inclusion and engagement and investigate the interactions between risk, reputation and engagement effects further. Lastly, 
our study looked at a specific type of intermediary only. Graffin & Ward (2010) distinguish between different types of intermediaries, such as 
certification, rating and accreditation agencies and suggest each will have different effects on corporate reputation under situations of 
uncertainty. They suggest that these differences will depend on whether the outcome of evaluation is based on a relative rank ordering or a 
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measure of absolute performance against the standard in question (Graffin & Ward, 2010). Further research could explore different types of 
intermediaries, including those using absolute or relative performance benchmarks, to examine their effects.    
Conclusion 
Previous research shows that RI indices act as reputation intermediaries by evaluating information regarding CSP for investors and other 
stakeholders (Doh et al, 2010; Consolandi et al, 2009). Our research shows that the role of intermediaries is not confined to information 
provision. We identify three mechanisms that may influence CSP: exclusion threats, signalling and engagement. By explicating these 
mechanisms we provide a more comprehensive view of the role of intermediaries in conferring legitimacy and reputation for CSP. The identified 
mechanisms may be used to study the effects on CSP beyond the corruption and bribery context, as well as providing a useful framework to 
study the effects of other forms of engagement. 
 
Table 1. Variables used in the study 
Dependent variable Description Data source Coding/proxy Testing 
Compliance Binary variable that indicates whether a 
company meets the FTSE4Good Index 
criteria  
FTSE4Good 
database 
1= the company meets the Index criteria, 0 otherwise, for 
period 2007-2010 
Model 1, 
H1, H2a 
Countering Bribery 
practices  
Describes the total score given to 
corporate countering bribery practices, 
reflecting high levels of CSP in this area 
EIRIS CSP data Summed score for quality of corporate policy, 
management system, and reporting.  Based on converted 
numerical EIRIS scores, range between 0 (low) and9 
(high), for period 2007-2010 
Model 2, 
H2b, H3 
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Independent variables   
Exclusion threat The company is threatened with 
exclusion for not meeting the 
FTSE4Good Countering Bribery criteria 
FTSE4Good 
database 
1= the company is included in the Index, but does not 
meet the Countering Bribery practices,0 otherwise, for 
period 2007-2010 
H1 
Signalling The company communicates its inclusion 
in the FTSE4Good Index to stakeholders 
Corporate CSP 
reporting 
1= the company uses the name/logo of the Index in its 
communications, 0 otherwise, for period 2007-2010 
 
H2a,b 
Engagement The intensity of the engagement process 
with the FTSE RI team 
FTSE 
correspondence 
Number of months the dialogue lasted plus number of 
company actions undertaken during dialogue; 1st quartile 
coded ‘low’, 2nd quartile coded ‘medium’, 3rd and 4th 
quartile ‘high’ 
H3 
Control variables   
CSP reporting The company uses the GRI to report on 
CSP  
GRI Database 1= the company uses GRI, 0 otherwise, for the period 
2007-2010 
 
Size The size of the company Datastream Natural logarithm of number of employees  
ROA Financial performance of the company. Datastream Return on Assets  
Risk Management risk tolerance Datastream Long-term Debt/Total Assets  
Intangibles Intangible assets including goodwill, 
patents, and copyright 
Datastream Natural logarithm of intangible assets  
Industry ICB classification (supersector) FTSE/EIRIS Including Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, 
Consumer Goods, Healthcare, Telecom, Utilities              
 
UK Dummy variable indicating a company is 
listed in the UK 
FTSE/EIRIS 1= listed in the UK, 0 otherwise  
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Table 2. Summary statistics and correlations 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.Compliance 0.57 0.49             
2.CB 
practices 
3.93 2.25 0.810***            
3.Exclusion 
threat 
0.11 0.31 0.113** 0.091*           
4.Engagement 
low 
0.04 0.20 0.105** 0.072* 0.686***          
5.Engagement 
med 
0.02 0.14 0.084* 0.072* 0.455*** -0.039         
6.Engagement 
high 
0.03 0.15 -0.010 0.005 0.500*** -0.043 -0.028        
7.Signalling 0.24 0.43 0.365*** 0.357*** 0.197*** 0.148*** 0.127*** 0.048       
8.CSP 
Reporting 
0.31 0.46 0.403*** 0.407*** -0.048 0.008 -0.043 -0.060 0.267***      
9.Size 9.58 1.71 0.390*** 0.443*** -0.054 -0.015 -0.060 -0.023 0.169*** 0.323***     
10.Intangibles 13.83 2.18 0.411*** 0.474*** -0.033 -0.016 -0.071* 0.025 0.250*** 0.394*** 0.681***    
11.Risk 0.76 1.15 0.084* 0.062 0.073* 0.118*** -0.072* 0.043 0.125*** 0.085* -0.082* 0.134***   
12.ROA 7.25 9.77 -0.003 0.014 0.018 -0.021 0.068 -0.002 0.051 -0.046 0.081* -0.023 -0.081*  
13.Risk 0.38 0.48 -0.160*** -0.144*** 0.062 0.025 0.140*** -0.048 -0.078* -0.253*** -0.375*** -0.367*** -0.093** 0.015 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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Table 3.Binary logit analysis of compliance with the FTSE4Good criteria 
 
 
  
Model 1 
Exclusion threat 2.875** 
Signalling 5.702*** 
CSP reporting 3.410*** 
Size 1.608*** 
Intangibles 1.176** 
Risk 1.139 
ROA 0.983 
Oil & Gas 2.801** 
Basic Materials 1.127 
Industrials 1.349 
Consumer goods 1.023 
Healthcare 8.715*** 
Telecommunications 0.402 
Utilities 1.253 
UK 1.386 
2008 2.082** 
2009 3.354*** 
2010 3.426*** 
  
N 813 
pseudo R2 0.313 
Wald chi2  186.32*** 
df 18 
Log pseudo likelihood -387.18 
Odds ratios reported,  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
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Table 4. Tobit analysis of the quality of Countering Bribery practices 
 
                           
                                            Model 2 
Signalling 1.231*** 1.268*** 
Engagement low 0.513  
Engagement med 1.241*** 1.185*** 
Engagement high  0.381 
CSP reporting 0.872*** 0.884*** 
Size 0.458*** 0.464*** 
Intangibles 0.204*** 0.199*** 
Risk 0.0419 0.0545 
ROA 0.00238 0.00194 
Oil & Gas 1.217*** 1.172*** 
Basic Materials 0.0669 0.0271 
Industrials 0.608* 0.564* 
Consumer goods -0.276 -0.305 
Healthcare 1.582*** 1.530*** 
Telecommunications -0.282 -0.375 
Utilities 0.982** 0.963** 
UK 0.528** 0.549*** 
2008 1.165*** 1.208*** 
2009 1.595*** 1.609*** 
2010 1.670*** 1.663*** 
   
N 798 798 
pseudo R2 0.134 0.133 
F 37.94*** 37.96*** 
Log pseudo likelihood -1532.07 -1533.03 
 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.00
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Appendix A. FTSE4Good Countering Bribery Criteria 
Risk Classification* FTSE4Good Countering Bribery Criteria Indicators 
Sector Companies from the following ICB (Industry Classification 
Benchmark) sectors and sub-sectors are considered more likely to 
have the highest levels of exposure to risk of engaging in bribery: 
• Oil & Gas Producers; Oil Equipment, Services, & 
Distribution; Chemicals; Industrial Metals; Mining; 
Construction & Materials; Aerospace & Defense; General 
Industrials; Electronic & Electrical Equipment; Industrial 
Engineering; Support Services; Electricity; Gas, Water, & 
Multi-Utilities. 
• Pharmaceuticals; Hotels; Fixed Line Telecommunications; 
Mobile Telecommunications; Software & Computer Services; 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 
Policy • Prohibits giving and receiving bribes (companies that are 
signatories to the UN Global Compact may be considered 
committed to this criteria indicator) 
• Commits to obeying all relevant laws 
• Commits to restricting and controls facilitation payments 
• Commits to restricting giving and receiving gifts 
• Policy is publicly available 
 
Countries Companies operating in countries that are deemed to have the 
highest risk, or perceived risk of, levels of bribery: 
• Countries scoring 4 or less on the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index. 
• Countries scoring 0 or less (negative) on the World Bank 
Governance Indicators list. 
Management • Communicates policy to employees 
• Trains relevant employees 
• Compliance mechanisms (e.g. assurance, audits, monitoring, 
board reports) 
• Provides secure communication channels for employees to 
seek advice or voice concerns 
• (e.g., hotlines, advice lines, whistle-blowing procedures for 
protection, internal reporting mechanism) 
• Procedures to remedy non-compliance** 
 
Public 
contracts 
Companies that are involved in any way with 
government/public contracts, or where a government licence is 
critical to the operation of their business, are considered as 
having the highest levels of exposure to risk of engaging in 
bribery. 
 
Reporting • Policy is publicly disclosed 
• Compliance mechanisms are publicly disclosed 
 
*All three filters must apply to each company before they are designated ‘High Risk’ 
**Where there is a significant and credible controversy/allegation that a company, its business partners, including suppliers, contractors or agents are committing bribery, the 
company must have taken visible, demonstrable or quantifiable steps to prove it has investigated these allegations effectively and in a timely manner 
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